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Applications of a Contemporary
Partnership Model for Divorce
Cynthia Starnes*
She rose to his requirement, dropped
The playthings of her life
To take the honorable work
Of woman and of wife. 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

For over twenty years, large numbers of women who
perform the "honorable work . . . of wife" have been sacrificed
to no-fault's selective partnership model of divorce. 2 Some of
these women are America's former heroines-homemakers of
the "Betty Crocker" era. Others are younger, wage-earning
wives whose marketplace participation has been limited by
their primary caretaking responsibilities, often involving
children. Each group of women has been hard-hit by the nofault preference for a clean break and the consequent
reluctance of courts to order substantial maintenance. Efforts
to "repair" such caretakers through brief awards of
"rehabilitative" maintenance have served primarily to soothe
the no-fault conscience while caretakers continue to descend
into poverty. This situation has prompted some commentators
to counsel abandonment of the partnership model of divorce.
The problem, however, is not with partnership law. Rather,
the problem is with no-fault's selective incorporation of
partnership principles. The resulting model speaks to the

' Professor, Detroit College of Law. The author first proposed the
contemporary partnership model for divorce in a more detailed article entitled
Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing
with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L.
REV. 67 (1993).
1 THE COMPLETE POEMS OF EMILY DICKENSON 359 (1960).

2 In this article, I presume that a spouse who performs caretaking chores is
female. While some men certainly do assume the role of full-time or primary
caretaker, their numbers are small. See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
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termination of an ideal marriage, while dangerously ignoring
real marriage. Partnership law can do much better. Indeed,
broad use of partnership principles produces a no-fault model
that both encourages the ideal in marriage and sensibly
addresses the real. Under such a contemporary partnership
model, divorce is seen as the dissociation of a spouse from a
shared enterprise. While dissociation ends the relationship, it
does not usually trigger a winding-up of any shared enterprise
in which the spouses have invested. If this enterprise
continues, a dissociated spouse should receive a buyout of her
interest. This buyout right provides a theoretical basis for
maintenance. It also provides an easily applied, presumptive
method for calculating an appropriate amount of maintenance,
thus limiting the broad judicial discretion that now makes
divorce orders unpredictable, invites gender bias, and impedes
meaningful negotiations between the parties. 3
Section II of this article will discuss ideals in contemporary
marriage. Section III will discuss realities of contemporary
marriage. Finally, section IV will illustrate the contemporary
partnership model by applying it to a paradigmatic marriage:
(1) the traditional marriage, (2) the hybrid marriage, and (3)
the egalitarian marriage. Section IV will discuss two variations
involving the caretaker who outpaces her spouse in the market
and the childless caretaker. This illustration will demonstrate
the efficacy of a contemporary partnership model in addressing
both the real and the ideal marriage.
II.

IDEALS IN CONTEMPORARY MARRIAGE-ARE WE ONE
FLESH?

Concepts of marriage have changed dramatically in recent
decades. No longer is marriage viewed as a Blackstonian
merging of husband and wife into one flesh-the husband's. 4
And gone is the day when marriage imposed a lifetime duty on
a husband to support his wife. Today's ideal marriage is an
"egalitarian relationship with equal sharing of responsibility
for decision making."5 During this marriage, spouses function
3 For a discussion of the problems of broad judicial discretion in divorce,
see Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker, A Discourse on
Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U.
CHI. 1. REV. 67, 92-95, 101-06 (1993).
4 HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 175
(3d ed. 1990). See also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 442 (Layston Press
1966) (1765) (the husband and wife are one person in law).
5 Gregg Temple, Freedom of Contract and Intimate RPlationships, 8 HARV.
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as a partnership, sharing resources, responsibilities, and
risks, 6 a framework that encourages cooperation and
caretaking commitments. 7 Although such a marriage hardly
mirrors Blackstone's view, its emphasis on the unit over the
individual reflects the Biblical image of spouses as "one
flesh" 8-the unit's.
No-fault's partnership model for divorce presumes this
ideal marriage. In tune with egalitarian principles, no-fault
adopts the partnership concept that any partner can leave the
partnership at will, 9 thus dissolving the relationship and
triggering liquidation of assets, payment of debts, and
distribution of remaining proceeds to the partners. 10 This
winding-up 11 of the partnership concludes the partners' rights
and obligations. 12 Consistent with these selected partnership
rules, no-fault divorce occasions division of marital property,
after which marital partners, like commercial partners, leave
the partnership free to begin new ventures without any
lingering entanglements. 13
If spouses are indeed partners who share equally the
advantages and disadvantages of participation in a failed
marriage, this simple no-fault scheme makes some sense.
Unfortunately, most couples fall far short of achieving an ideal

J.L. & PuB. PoL'y 121, 152 (1985).
6 Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questions
the Reforms: Feminist Perspectives on Divorce Law, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE
CROSSROADS 191, 198 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990) ("the
ideal to which marriage aspires [is] that of equal partnerships between spouses
who share resources, responsibilities, and risks").
7 ld. at 199.
8 Genesis 2:24.
9 See UN!F. PROB. CODE §§ ::ll, 32, 6 U.L.A. 376, 394 (1969) (providing that
a partnership dissolves upon the at-will departure of a partner); see also UNIF.
PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 29, 31, 6 U.L.A. 364, 376 (1969) (stating the unalterable right
of a partner to dissolve the partnership at any time).
10 See HAROLD G. REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF
AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 345 (2d ed. 1990).
11 See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 30, 6 U.L.A. 367 (1969) (distinguishes
between a dissolution and a winding up: "On dissolution the partnership is not
terminated but continues until the winding up of partnership affairs is
completed."); see also UN!F. PARNERSHIP AcT § 29 commentary at 9, cmt. b, 6
U.L.A. 365 (1969) (defining "winding up" as the "process of settling partnership
affairs after dissolution").
12 See ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. R!BSTEIN, BROMBERG AND R!BSTEIN
ON PARTNERSHIP § 7.08 (1991).
13 See U.M.D.A., Prefatory Note, 9A U.L.A. 149 (1987): "the distribution of
property upon termination of a marriage should be treated, as nearly as possible,
like the distribution of assets incident to the dissolution of a partnership."
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marnage.
III.

REALITIES OF CONTEMPORARY MARRIAGE-WHO MAKEs
THE BED AND How MUCH DOES IT CosT?

Despite the popular rhetoric of equality, the reality is that
contemporary marriage is not ideal marriage-it is still a
gender-biased institution. Who makes the bed? In most homes,
the honest response is that the wife does. Indeed, there is
evidence that only one husband in twenty makes the bed in
which he sleeps. 14 "Making the bed" is only a euphemism for
the many endless responsibilities involved in caretaking-the
cooking, the cleaning, the washing, the shopping, the caring for
children or aging parents.
For many wives, such caretaking is a full-time job. The
Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that in 1991 approximately
sixteen million women-as against only 415,000 men-were not
in the labor force because they were "keeping house." 15 Even a
wife who works outside the home is likely to undertake a
disproportionately large share of caretaking responsibilities.
One study indicates that women remain responsible for
approximately seventy percent of the housework and working
wives spend twice as much time on caretaking tasks as
working husbands. 16 Whether she is a full-time or part-time
worker, Betty Crocker remains very much a part of most
American marriages.
How much does it cost a woman to "make the beds?" The
quick, if superficial, response of many men is likely to be: very
little or nothing. In the words of a New York legislator:
The perception of most men-and the judiciary is mostly
male-is that care of the house and children can be done with

14 DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE
LAW 174 (1989).

lfi BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, UNITED STATES DEfY!'. OF LABOR, 39
EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS 204, at tbl. 35 (1992). In 1991, there were 51.5
million married women in the United States. !d. In that same year, 22.7 million
women (married or unmarried) stayed out of the labor force because they were
"keeping house." An additional 1.2 million wanted a job, but did not look for one
because of "home responsibility." !d.
Moreover, at least 50% of wage-earning women report having previously
dropped out of the labor force because of family reasons, as compared to one
percent of all wage-earning men. RHODE, supra note 14, at 174.
16 RHODE, supra note 14, at 174; 1we also SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE
UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN, at xiv (1991) (noting that the only
major change in the last fifteen years is that now middle class men think they do
more around the house).
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one hand tied behind the back. Send the kids out to school,
put them to bed, and the rest of the time [is] free to play
tennis and bridge. 17

Actually, primary caretakers pay a high price for their
efforts in the home. Mincer and Polacheck report that women
who remain out of the labor market after the birth of their first
child suffer a decline in earning capacity of about 1.5% per
year. 18 Because of her family responsibilities, the wageearning caretaker has less time to devote to a career, which
often limits her career choice and opportunities for
advancement. The Bureau of the Census confirms that many
wage-earning women "choose work that will fit around ...
their family responsibilities, a complication and impediment to
occupational advancement not faced by most men." 19 Not
surprisingly, many caretakers are channeled into the secondary
job market, where wages are low and opportunities for
advancement minimal. The division of labor in the home thus
exacts a high toll from women and contributes to the disparity
in men's and women's wages.
When a caretaker divorces, she loses her male buffer and
is thrust into the market economy where she alone faces the
cost of her caretaking role. No-fault's partnership model,
however, fails to acknowledge her situation, instead assuming
the ideal where spouses are equal partners who can begin new
lives on an equal footing. Herein lies a dangerous reverie of
denial-"Women aren't caretakers; caretaking doesn't take
time; caretaking doesn't disadvantage women; any
disadvantage will disappear m the blink of an eye
(rehabilitative maintenance)."20

17 Lynn H. Schatran, Documenting Gender Bias in the Courts: The Task
Force Approach, 70 JUDICATURE 280, 285 (1987) (quoting a New York legislator).
18 Jacob Mincer & Solomon Polachek, Family Investments in Human Capital:
Earnings of Women, in ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY: MARRIAGE, CHILDREN AND

HUMAN CAPITAL 397, 415 (Theodore W. Schultz ed., 1974). Women with advanced
degrees suffer an even higher rate of depreciation. !d. For a discussion of the
difficulties faced by a homemaker entering the market after full-time homemaking,
see Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on
Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U.
CHI. L. REV. 67, 81-85 (1993).
19 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, UNITED STATES DEPr. OF COMMERCE, SERIES P23, WOMEN IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 7 (1986).
20 See Starnes, supra note 18, at 97-101 (addressing the illusion that
rehabilitative maintenance can achieve equity for a caretaker); see also Ann L.
Estin, Maintenance, Alimony, and the Rehabilitation of Family Care, 71 N.C. L.
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No-fault also erroneously supposes that dissolution of the
marital partnership necessarily terminates the marital
enterprise. In fact, this is hardly ever the case. Because a
commercial partnership also often continues after a partner
leaves, partnership law provides rules for these situations. 21
These rules provide a rich model for divorce.
IV.

A CONTEMPORARY PARTNERSHIP MODEL-DISSOCIATION
AND BUYOUT

In the common case in which partnership business
continues after a partner's dissociation, the Revised Uniform
Partnership Act (RUPA) requires remaining partners to buy
out the interest of the dissociated partner. 22 The buyout price
reflects the dissociated partner's interest in the continuing
partnership. This buyout rule provides a conceptual basis for
maintenance.
As in a commercial partnership, a spouse's dissociation
terminates the relationship but does not necessarily trigger a
winding-up of the marital enterprise. If this enterprise
continues, a dissociated spouse should receive a buyout of her
interest.
But what is a marital enterprise? Simply stated, it is the
income-generating activity of the marriage. The value of this
enterprise is measured by the spouses' enhanced human capital
attributable to marital investment. While the marital unit may
invest in a spouses' human capital through education or
training, more often an investment occurs simply through the
expenditure of time and effort in the market, which results in
experience and perhaps seniority. Whether the marital unit
invests in the human capital of one or both spouses, these
investments are jointly made in the expectation, express or
implied, that they will generate a return that will be jointly
enjoyed.
Although dissociation terminates the parties' marriage, it
usually does not terminate this income-generating marital
enterprise, which continues to function in the marketplace as

REV. 721 (1993) (documenting how maintenance law takes little account of younger

caregivers and advocating shifts in the law to rehabilitate family care values).
21 See Donald J. Weidner, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act Midstream:
Major Policy Decisions, 21 U. TOL. L. REV. R25, 837 (1990).
22 See REV. UNIF. PARTNERSIIIP ACT § 701 (199:i); seP also UN!F.
PARTNERSHIP ACT § 38(a), 6 U.L.A. 456 (1969) (requiring a buyout of the interest
of a departing partner in certain instances).
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one or both spouses generate income attributable to marital
investments. If, for example, the husband works outside the
home and the wife works in the home, the marital unit invests
exclusively in the human capital of the husband. While the
husband and wife both labor for the benefit of the unit, only
the husband experiences an enhanced ability to generate
income. If the marriage ends, the husband takes this marital
enterprise with him and should buy out the wife's interest.

A.

Calculating a Buyout

The buyout price should be set at the time of divorce in
order to afford spouses the emotional and financial planning
benefits of a clean break. Determining this buyout price requires two steps: ( 1) estimating the value of the marital enterprise and (2) fixing a dissociated spouse's share of that value.
Value lies in the parties' enhanced ability to generate income
attributable to marital investment. One might presumptively
estimate this value by approximating each party's future earnings (by averaging income over a previous period, e.g., three to
five years) and then reducing that figure to roughly measure
enhancement (by subtracting earnings at marriage). 23 This
simple method of estimating value would maximize predictability and minimize costs for the parties.
Valuation of the marital enterprise triggers the second step
in the buyout calculation-determining the share of that enterprise due a dissociated spouse. This buyout share should depend on marriage duration since the length of the marriage
roughly reflects the extent of a spouse's investment and, in the
case of a primary caretaker, her opportunity costs. The Uniform Probate Code (UPC) offers a reasonable model for establishing such a sliding-scale buyout share. The UPC bases a
spouse's elective share of an augmented estate on the length of
the marriage as a "first step in the overall plan of implementing a partnership or marital-sharing theory of marriage, with a
support theory back-up."24 Under such a sliding scale model, a
spouse who dissociates from a one-year marriage, for example,
would receive only three percent of any disparity in enhanced
earnings, while a spouse who dissociates after fifteen years of

23 All figures represent net income and are adjusted to current dollars. For
a more detailed description of the buyout calculation, see Starnes, supra note 18,
at 131-38.
24 UNIFORM PROB. CODE § 2-201 cmt., 8 U.L.A. 88, 89 (1983 & Supp. 1992).
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marriage would receive fifty percent of any disparity. 25
While this buyout calculation will produce a reasonable
buyout price in most cases, it raises a couple of concerns. Most
obviously, what if estimated income is not realized? Predicting
future earnings is a necessarily speculative process; a paying
spouse may die, become disabled, lose his job, retire, or undertake low-paying, public service employment. Investing in the
human capital of another person is risky business. The possibility that expected income will not materialize is a risk a spouse
assumes both during and after marriage. Thus, the buyout
price should be modifiable upon a substantial change in the
payor's circumstance. 26
One might also question the presumption that enhanced
income during marriage results from marital investment. While
it is true that investments in human capital may actually occur
over the course of a lifetime, 27 any unfairness in discounting
most such long-term investments is greatly reduced by inclusion of marriage duration in the buyout calculation. The extent
of marital investment, as measured by marriage duration, will
ordinarily correlate with the amount of enhanced earnings and
will define the buyout share. A one-year marriage, for example,
25 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-201, 8 U.L.A. 88-89 (1983 & Supp. 1992).
The UPC establishes the following sliding scale:

lf the decedent and spouse
The elective-share
were married to each other:
percentage is:
Less than 1 yr.
Supplemental amount only
1 yr. but less than 2 yr.
3% of augmented estate
2 yr. but less than 3 yr.
6% of augmented estate
3 yr. but less than 4 yr.
9% of augmented estate
4 yr. but less than 5 yr.
12% of augmented estate
5 yr. but less than 6 yr.
15% of augmented estate
6 yr. but less than 7 yr.
18% of augmented estate
7 yr. but less than 8 yr.
21% of augmented estate
8 yr. but less than 9 yr.
24% of augmented estate
9 yr. but less than 10 yr.
27% of augmented estate
10 yr. but less than 11 yr.
30% of augmented estate
11 yr. but less than 12 yr.
34% of augmented estate
12 yr. but less than 13 yr.
38% of augmented estate
13 yr. but less than 14 yr.
42% of augmented estate
14 yr. but less than 15 yr.
46% of augmented estate
15 yr. or more
50% of augmented estate
26 The buyout price should not be modifiable, however, upon the remarriage
of the dissociated spouse since a buyout is based on investment, rather than need
or duty of support.
27 See Allan M. Parkman, The Recognition of Human Capital as Property in
Divorce Settlements, 40 ARK. L. REV. 439, 446-65 (1987) (advocating treatment of
human capital as marital property only when the investment during marriage is
"substantial" and would not have occurred without the support of the spouse).
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will ordinarily generate limited enhanced earnings and will
trigger only a three percent buyout share. Thus, the buyout
calculation will ordinarily produce a small buyout price when
marital investment is small. There will be extraordinary cases,
however, where the presumptive method for calculating a
buyout price will be inappropriate. Consider, for example, the
wife who marries a medical student in his last month of training. If this couple soon divorces, the wife might claim a huge
buyout based on her husband's enhanced earnings which are
largely attributable to his pre-marital investment. But in such
an unusual case a husband could very easily rebut the presumption that value should be estimated through simple averaging and subtracting. In ordinary cases, however, presumptively attributing enhancement in earnings during marriage to marital investment will not unreasonably distort the
buyout calculation and will afford the parties a simple, inexpensive, and predictable method for determining the buyout
pnce.

B. Three Marriages
This contemporary partnership model can best be explained through three paradigmatic marriages: (1) the traditional marriage, (2) the hybrid marriage, and (3) the egalitarian marriage.

1.

The traditional marriage

Suppose the spouses, either by decision or by default, opt
for a traditional marriage in which the husband works outside
the home and the wife is a full-time homemaker. In this case,
the marital unit has invested exclusively in the husband's human capital. When the parties divorce, the husband may leave
the marriage with enhanced earning capacity, resulting from a
marital investment in his human capital. He thus takes the
marital enterprise with him. When these traditional spouses
divorce, the wife should receive a buyout of her interest in the
marital enterprise.
If these traditional spouses were married fifteen years and
during this period the husband's earnings increased from
$10,000 to $100,000, the marital enterprise would be presumptively valued at $90,000. Because the marriage lasted fifteen
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years, the wife's buyout share would be fifty percent. 28 Thus,
the buyout price would be: fifty percent times $90,000, which
equals $45,000 per year. If, however, the spouses were only
married five years and the husband's earnings increased from
$10,000 to $40,000, the marital enterprise would be valued at
$30,000, and the wife would receive fifteen percent of that
value, or $4,500 per year.

2.

The hybrid marriage

Suppose the spouses adopt a more common division of
labor in which both parties work outside the home, but the wife
is the primary caretaker. Because of her multiple responsibilities, this wife has fewer hours to devote to her job than does
her husband, which may result in income disparity between
husband and wife. When this wife dissociates from the marriage, she takes with her a part of the marital enterprise, measured by her own enhanced earnings attributable to marital investment. If she takes a smaller portion of the marital enterprise than her husband takes-i.e., if her enhanced earnings
are less than his-she should receive a buyout.
If the parties were married fifteen years and the wife's
earnings increased from $10,000 to $30,000 and the husband's
earnings increased from $30,000 to $90,000, the marital enterprise would be presumptively valued at $80,000 ($20,000 +
$60,000). The wife, however, takes only $20,000 of this value,
while the husband takes $60,000, producing a disparity of
$40,000. Because the marriage lasted fifteen years, the wife's
buyout share would be fifty percent. Thus, her buyout price
would be fifty percent times $40,000 (the disparity), which
equals $20,000 per year. If, however, the marriage lasted only
five years and the wife's earnings increased from $10,000 to
$15,000 and the husband's earnings increased from $30,000 to
$45,000, the marital enterprise would be presumptively valued
at $20,000. The wife would take $5,000 of this value with her,
while the husband would take $15,000, producing a disparity of
$10,000. Given the five year duration of the marriage, the
wife's buyout price would be fifteen percent times $10,000, or a
total $1,500 per year.

28 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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The egalitarian marriage

Suppose the spouses achieve the ideal-both parties work
full-time and each performs exactly fifty percent of household
chores and care for any children or other family members. In
such an extraordinary relationship, the marital unit makes two
equal investments-one in the husband and another in the
wife. It might therefore appear that, because the egalitarian
marital unit has invested equally in the spouses, each spouse
takes one-half of the marital enterprise upon divorce and neither should receive a buyout.
If these spouses leave the marriage with disparate enhanced earnings, however, a buyout may be appropriate despite
the egalitarian nature of the marriage. There are two reasons
for this conclusion.
First, valuation of a continuing enterprise depends on the
return on marital investments rather than the nature of each
partner's contribution. If spouses are truly partners, these
returns on joint investments are partnership returns, not individual returns. In the absence of the parties' agreement otherwise,29 the character or identity of the individual partner's
contributions to the unit should not be dispositive of her share
in partnership returns.
Second, limiting buyouts to non-egalitarian marriages
would invite an inappropriate debate over the nature and extent of caretaking services. If a husband could show, for example, that he performed fifty percent of caretaking services rather than forty-nine percent, he could avoid paying his wife a
buyout. This ludicrous inquiry focuses on the wrong issue. For
both conceptual and practical reasons, therefore, the question
should not be identity of contribution, but rather the return to
the marital unit on joint investments.
As these three paradigmatic marriages illustrate, a contemporary partnership model provides a conceptual basis for
maintenance under no-fault, identifies cases where maintenance is appropriate, and prescriptively fixes the amount of
maintenance, replacing the vagaries of judicial discretion with
presumptive bright-line rules. Adoption of this contemporary
partnership model would work a sea-change in current divorce

29 A prenuptial agreement could fix the parties rights according to the identity or character of the contribution.

118

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 8

law by ordinarily beginning the divorce process with the presumption that a spouse with enhanced earnings owes indefinite
maintenance to a caretaker. Such a starting point would do
much to alter the current financial plunder of caretakers under
no-fault. This contemporary partnership model will also usually
deny or severely limit maintenance in marriages popularly
thought to be inappropriate cases for maintenance, such as the
very short marriage and the marriage later in life when income
has already peaked.
While most marriages may fall within one of the three
paradigms just described, there are two variations that warrant
special attention: ( 1) the caretaking wife who outpaces her
husband, and (2) the childless caretaker.

C.
1.

Two Variations

The tortoise and the hare-the case of the high-achieving
caretaker

This contemporary partnership model will not always require the higher wage-earner to buy out the other spouse, and
one can imagine a scenario in which the opposite result follows.
Consider a wife who was employed as a sales clerk at the time
of the marriage but was promoted to department manager by
the time of divorce. Suppose that her annual earnings increased from $10,000 to $25,000 during marriage. Suppose
further that at the time of their marriage, the husband was a
corporate officer who netted $100,000 annually, but that due to
a negative economy, his earnings had only increased to
$110,000 at the time of divorce. Because this wife takes a larger share of enhanced earnings, she must buy out her higherearning husband, and while this result may seem counter-intuitive, it is a fair application of the principle that maintenance is
an investment return. The logic that a partner who makes a
good investment is entitled to its reward is no less compelling
where the lower wage-earner increases earnings more than the
higher wage-earner.
One could, however, avoid the harsh effect on the lower
wage-earner in two ways. One is by establishing a presumption
that the spouse with the lower earnings at divorce need not
buy out the other spouse's interest. Another is by establishing a
rule that "catching-up is free," so that only enhanced earnings
that exceed the other spouse's earnings at the time of marriage
would be subject to buyout. If, for example, the wife's earnings
increased during the marriage from $10,000 to $105,000, and
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the husband's increased from $100,000 to $110,000, only the
wife's excess enhanced earnings of $5,000 ($105,000 minus
$100,000) would be subject to buyout.

2.

Cooking for two-the case of the childless caretaker

Some commentators have advocated barring maintenance
in childless marriages. The justification seems to be that the
full-time, childless caretaker was the principal beneficiary of
her decision to stay home and has already reaped her reward.
This rationale is conceptually troublesome. Focusing on the
quality and quantity of an individual's contribution entertains
a curious post hoc judgment of a division of labor that the
spouses, whether expressly or by default, agreed to during the
marriage. Such Monday-morning-quarterbacking is also inconsistent with the concept of marriage as a partnership of equals
who make different but equally valuable contributions to the
marital unit.
Also troublesome is the devaluation of caretaking implicit
in the denial of maintenance to childless caretakers. Such a
devaluation is, of course, not uncommon. 30 The message is
that caretaking has little or no value unless it is directed toward a child. Cooking, cleaning, washing, shopping, entertaining of friends and associates, and caring for aging family members thus have little value.
Although it is not often held in high esteem, caretaking is
a valuable service that is sometimes necessary. 31 Caretaking

30 For a brief account of the glory days of caretaking as a highly esteemed
profession, see Starnes, supra note 18, at 7:-3-75. Today, the full-time caretaker may
be embarrassed to confess her role. The wage-earning wife may confine herself to
the closet, daily marching to the market rhetoric of self-investment while nightly
succumbing, in private, to the realities of unmade beds, dirty clothes, a messy
house, and a hungry spouse and children.
31 Responding to the needs of an infant is one example of on-demand
caretaking. Not all caretaking services can be purchased, as they often must be
provided at random and in small segments of time. Moreover, any purchased services will not duplicate the services of a caretaker who initially knows family
members and takes responsibility for providing care as it is needed. Clare Brown,
Home Prediction in Use in a Market Economy, in RETHINKING THE FAMILY 151, 155
(Barry Thorne & Marilyn Yalom eds., 1982). Ms. Brown also notes:
The home economy focuses on individual and family well being, and its
personalized care and nurturing cannot be given a price tag by comparing
the services of the home economy with what a family is willing to pay for
occasional substitutes (e.g., child care, meals out, maid service), since the
occasional substitute is not comparable to a permanent replacement . . . .
So far the marketplace has not provided a permanent replacement for the

120

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 8

is also "socially necessary" in that it produces value above necessity, thus enhancing the family's life. 32 Such socially necessary caretaking includes time spent in nurturing non-economic
needs for love and self-development, 33 a process that may include entertaining friends and relatives. To deny maintenance
to a childless caretaker is to deny the value and the cost of
many valuable caretaking functions.
Most troublesome, however, is the devaluation of women
implicit in a denial of maintenance to childless caretakers. A
woman's ability to achieve the status of equal marital partner
is made to depend on whether she has borne a child to her
husband. Women who do not perform this function for their
husbands are thus afforded second-class rights in the divorce
courts. To hinge a woman's worth on her having children is an
offensive notion with feudal overtones. Its continued viability in
the 1990s is shocking.
In addition to these conceptual concerns, the denial of
maintenance to childless marriages suffers from practical inconsistencies. The category of childless marriages is both over
and under inclusive, since it would include a childless caretaker whose husband forbade her to work as well as the wife who
gave up a career in order to relocate repeatedly with her husband for the advancement of his career. This category would
also include the childless wife who spent her days clipping coupons, shopping, cleaning, washing, ironing, entertaining her
husband's associates and volunteering her "spare" time to charitable causes, and who could ill-afford to contract out any caretaking services. There is no justification for denying maintenance to these women simply because they have not borne
children to their husbands.
In addition, if the category of childless marriages is intended to preclude maintenance to caretakers who have been the
main beneficiary of their lifestyle, then it is under inclusive,
because it would allow maintenance to the wife who hires a
live-in nanny, a maid, and perhaps a chauffeur and tutor, and
who spends her days at the country club. And what of the wife
whose children are in school? Is maintenance available to her
services provided in the home economy.
!d. at 163.
32 !d. at 15:-l.
:i3 Examples of such socially necessary caretaking might include counseling,
tutoring and reading to a child, organizing family outings or vacations, coordinating
visits and holiday and birthday correspondence with an extended family, or giving
dinner parties.
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even if she stays home from 9:00 to 3:00? And what of the
nonwage-earning wife whose last child left home ten years ago?
The category of childless marriages is thus both conceptually
troublesome and practically ill-equipped to achieve its goals.

V.

CONCLUSION

Now is the time for an honest evaluation of the costs of
divorce to primary caretakers and for serious efforts to reform
the law so that women no longer bear those costs alone. It is to
be hoped that this contemporary partnership model will further
these efforts and at the same time provide a model that encourages ideal marriage in which roles are determined through
choice rather than gender.

